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Bridging levels of ‘‘granularity’’ and ‘‘scale’’ are frequently cited as key problems for biomedical informatics. However, detailed
accounts of what is meant by these terms are sparse in the literature. We argue for distinguishing two notions: ‘‘size range,’’ which deals
with physical size, and ‘‘collectivity,’’ which deals with aggregations of individuals into collections, which have emergent properties and
eﬀects. We further distinguish these notions from ‘‘specialisation,’’ ‘‘degree of detail,’’ ‘‘density,’’ and ‘‘connectivity.’’ We argue that the
notion of ‘‘collectivity’’—molecules in water, cells in tissues, people in crowds, stars in galaxies—has been neglected but is a key to rep-
resenting biological notions, that it is a pervasive notion across size ranges—micro, macro, cosmological, etc.—and that it provides an
account of a number of troublesome issues including the most important cases of when the biomedical notion of parthood is, or is not,
best represented by a transitive relation. Although examples are taken from biomedicine, we believe these notions to have wider
application.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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It is a truism that a major challenge for bioinformatics is
to bridge levels of granularity and scale, from molecular, to
cellular, to organ, to organism, to ecology. However, it is
rarely made clear exactly what is meant by ‘‘granularity’’
or ‘‘scale’’ or what the consequences are of diﬀerences in
granularity and scale for which any explanation must
account.
This paper argues that it would be clearer to distinguish
unambiguously two dimensions. We term these two dimen-
sions ‘‘collectivity’’ and ‘‘size range’’ despite the risk of
adding yet further neologisms to the ﬁeld.1 The basic1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1 Although we would prefer to reserve the term ‘‘granularity’’ for the
notion here termed ‘‘collectivity,’’ the term ‘‘granularity’’ has become so
overloaded with diﬀerent meanings in diﬀerent ﬁelds that we reluctantly
opt for a neologism rather than risk further confusion and controversy.
‘‘Scale’’ conforms more closely to ‘‘size.’’ However, to avoid confusion we
have likewise been explicit in this paper and used the term ‘‘size range.’’notion that we put forward is that entities considered indi-
vidually at one level are considered as collectives with
emergent properties at the next level—e.g., collectives
grains of sand form a beach, collectives of stars form gal-
axies, collectives of cells form tissues. In general, for con-
venience, we shall refer to the ‘‘grains’’ of a ‘‘collective’’
and correspondingly to ‘‘granular parts.’’2 The notion of
‘‘collective’’ used here is similar to that of ‘‘groups’’ used
by Artale [1,2] and by Winston and Odell [3,4]. Winston
and Odell also put forward an analogous line of argument
to what are here called granular parts in discussing why
the ‘‘feet of geese’’ are not parts of a ‘‘ﬂock of geese.’’
However, neither they nor Padgham and Lambrix [5]
investigate this notion extensively. No analogous notion
is discussed by authors such as Gerstl and Pribennow
who discuss parts and wholes from a more linguistic per-
spective [6], nor do notions analogous to ‘‘collectives’’ and2 Alternatively we might refer to collectives as ‘‘emergent wholes,’’ but
we have avoided this usage as collectives are usually themselves parts of
greater wholes leading to awkward expressions such as ‘‘the emergent
whole that is part of the whole.’’
3 Hence our reluctance to use the phrase ‘‘emergent whole’’ (See
Footnote 2).
4 An OWL-DL ontology illustrating the principles can be found at
http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~rector/ontologies/collectivity.
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cussed by Smith et al. [7]. In biomedical ontologies, the
notion of ‘‘granular parts’’ is hinted at by the distinction
between ‘‘constituent parts’’ and other forms of part–
whole relation in the Foundational Model of Anatomy
[8], but it is not extensively developed or explored. Over-
all, we suggest that this is a seriously under investigated
aspect of representation and can be used to account for
several important phenomena.
Our fundamental contention is that there are proper-
ties and eﬀects of collectives that are emergent and do
not depend on diﬀerentiation amongst the properties of
the grains. By ‘‘emergent’’ we mean that (a) these prop-
erties and eﬀects cannot be predicted from the properties
of the individual grains and therefore must be attributed
to the collective as a whole, and that (b) all grains play
the same role with respect to these properties and eﬀects
in the collective. Some properties only make sense of a
collective—e.g., the pattern of a tiling or the arrange-
ment of cells in a tissue. It makes no sense to speak
of the pattern of a single tile or the alignment of a sin-
gle cell. In other cases the emergent properties are dis-
tinct from that of the grains even if related, e.g., the
mood of a crowd is distinct from the mood of its con-
stituent individuals, a beach has area and galaxies have
mass independent of the size of the grains of sand or
the mass of the stars in the galaxy; tissues have strength,
grow, etc., in ways distinct from the strength, growth,
etc., of the individual cells that comprise them. The fun-
damental point is that properties of the whole and the
information about it pertain to and are determined by
the collective rather than its grains. Here we take as
our prototype a classic hourglass. In some idealised
world it might be possible to determine how long it
took the sand to pass through an hourglass by examin-
ing the glass and the individual grains of sand and their
initial conﬁguration. In practice, no one would attempt
such a feat. The time required for the sand to ﬂow
through the hourglass is a collective property of the
sand in relation to the speciﬁc hourglass that contains
it and would be measured as such. Even were someone,
say a physicist specialised in ﬂuid mechanics, to attempt
such a feat, the ‘gold standard’ would remain the
observed time—i.e., the emergent property of the
collective.
Although the phenomenon of emergence is widely appli-
cable, our fundamental motivations are biological. We
seek:
1. To distinguish the way in which, for example, a cell is
part of the body from the way a ﬁnger is part of the
body—speciﬁcally that the loss of a cell does not neces-
sarily diminish the body whereas the loss of a ﬁnger
does;
2. To use this to motivate an important criterion for when
parthood as used in biomedicine should, or should not,
be represented by a transitive relation;3. To represent loosely repetitive patterns in tissues—that
the ‘‘cells in the mucosa are aligned’’—and more gener-
ally patterns and other emergent properties of
collectives;
4. To deal with the collective eﬀects of cells, organelles,
etc.—e.g., the process of secretion and regulation of hor-
mones by the cells of endocrine organs or the collective
strength of muscles made up of indeterminate numbers
of muscle ﬁbres.
More often than not, collectives are themselves portions
of larger entities.3 Galaxies are more than mere collectives
of stars; tissues are more than collectives of cells; even a
beach is more than a collective of sand. If we have indepen-
dently measurable commensurable features for both the
collective and the larger entity, we can speak of the propor-
tion of the greater entity formed by the collective, e.g., the
proportion of water or salt in an amount of sea water, col-
lagen in tissue, or the proportion of the mass of galaxy
comprised of the visible stars.
Our goal is a set of broadly applicable principles. The
paper follows broadly the intent and lessons, although
not always the execution, of the OpenGALEN Common
Reference Model [9,10]. As an illustration we present
this paper and an implementation in the framework of
OWL-DL.4 However, the issues are general and indepen-
dent of any particular implementation.
1.1. Outline of approach
We distinguish two notions often confused under the
heading of ‘‘granularity’’:Collectivity Grains vs. Collectives—the degree of collecti-
visation, e.g., with respect to water ﬁlling a
lake, the relation ‘ﬁlling’ is to the water as,
amongst other things, a collective of water
molecules, not to the individual molecules
themselves.Size range Large vs. Small—the size of an object with
respect to the phenomena that aﬀect it, e.g.,
quantum scales of distance or relativistic
scales of speed. However, less extreme diﬀer-
ences in scale can have major eﬀects. Surface
tension is critical at the scale of a water ﬂea’s
interaction with water but not at that for a
human.Furthermore we distinguish two types of parthood as
subrelations of the basic mereological part–whole relation
related to collectivity.
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the ﬁnger of the skin to the
ﬁnger, in which an indeterminate
number of grains are parts of the
whole by virtue of being grains
in a collective that is part of the
whole, and in which removing
one granular part does not nec-
essarily damage or diminish the
whole.Determinate parthood e.g., the relation of the ﬁnger to
the hand, in which a determinate
number of parts (at any given
time) are directly part of the
whole, and in which removing
one determinate part necessarily
damages or diminishes the
whole.Note that the diﬀerence is in what follows necessari-
ly—removing grains may diminish the whole but remov-
ing one grain does not necessarily diminish the whole,
whereas removing one ﬁnger necessarily diminishes a
hand.
Our major contentions are that:
1. Collectives
(1a) ‘‘Collectives’’ are made up of ‘‘grains’’ all of which
play the same role in the collective.
(1b) ‘‘Collectives’’ are not mathematical sets—their
identity is not determined by their membership.
(The issue of the identity of collectives is discussed
in Section 4.4.1).
(1c) Being a ‘‘collective’’ (‘‘collectivity’’) is independent
of the number of grains in the collective.
(1d) There are emergent eﬀects and characteristics of
collectives as a whole not determinable from the
individual characteristics of their grains.2. Granular and determinate parts
(2a) ‘‘Determinate parthood’’ is transitive; granular
parthood is not.
(2b) Loss of or damage to ‘‘determinate parts’’ necessar-
ily diminishes or damages the whole; loss of or
damage to granular parts does not. More generally,
many eﬀects on determinate parts have correspond-
ing or related eﬀect on the whole; this is rarely true
for granular parts.
(2c) A collective that is a ‘‘determinate part’’ of a whole
remains a part of that whole regardless of the loss
or gain of grains. (The issue of ‘‘empty collectives’’
is dealt with in Section 4.3.2.)There are two criteria of distinguishing granular and
determinate parthood. The ﬁrst is ontological; the second
is cognitive or ‘‘informational’’:Ontological Whether there is a ﬁxed, or nearly ﬁxed
number of parts—e.g., ﬁngers of the hand,
chambers of the heart, or wheels of a car—
such that there can be a notion of a single
one being missing, or whether, by contrast,
the number of parts is indeterminate—e.g.,
cells in the skin of the hand, red cells in
blood, or rubber molecules in the tread of
the tyre of the wheel of the car.Informational Whether the information to be conveyed
pertains to the individual parts—e.g., the
laceration to the fourth ﬁnger—or to the
collective of parts—e.g., the arrangement
of the cells in the skin of the ﬁnger.These two criteria do not always correspond. In particu-
lar, we sometimes wish to refer to the collective properties
of a ﬁxed number of entities—i.e., to treat what are ontolog-
ically determinate parts informationally as being granular
parts. We will return to this issue towards the end of this
paper after the basic notions are established (see Section 4.3).
1.2. Other notions sometimes labelled ‘‘granularity’’
We further distinguish ‘‘collectivity’’ and ‘‘size range’’
from four other notions with which they may be confused,
and which other researchers have referred to as ‘granular-
ity’ in addressing mereological issues.Specialisation Category vs. kind—the usual notion of
‘‘is-kind-of,’’ e.g., that ‘‘mammal’’ is a
generalisation including, amongst other
things, dogs and elephants. Sometimes
also labelled ‘abstraction.’Degree of detail The amount of information represented
about each entity, regardless of its level
of specialisation. Crudely in an ontology
represented inOWL, thenumberofaxioms
and restrictions concerning each entity.Density The number of semantically ‘similar’
concepts in a particular conceptual
region. How ‘‘bushy’’ the subsumption
graph is. High local density in an ontol-
ogy usually co-occurs with high levels of
specialisation and degree of detail, but in
two diﬀerent ontologies of the same
overall depth, in a particular section
one may ﬁnd the same two categories
separated by diﬀerent numbers of inter-
vening categories or possessing very
diﬀerent numbers of sibling categories.Connectivity The number of entities connected
directly and indirectly to a given entity
either through generalisation/specialisa-
tion or by other properties.
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the authors [11,12] deals with specialisation and degree of
detail. Avoiding confusion with this usage is one of the
motivations for adopting the phrase ‘‘collectivity’’ rather
than ‘‘granularity.’’ The notion of ‘‘granular partitions,’’
along with the above four notions, are beyond the scope
of this paper.
1.3. Criteria for success of the proposed approach
Our purpose in developing ‘‘ontologies’’ is to support
information systems. The test of their adequacy is whether
they can eﬀectively represent the entities about which infor-
mation must be communicated so that communication is
‘‘faithful.’’ This focuses our interest as much on the rela-
tions5 as on the entities related.
Our speciﬁc application is biomedicine, so that we will
test our solution primarily with respect to well-known bio-
medical knowledge resources including the Digital Anato-
mist Foundational Model of Anatomy [8,13], the Open
Biology Ontology (OBO) and more particularly the Gene
Ontology [14–16] and OpenGALEN [10,17,18]. In addi-
tion, Johansson [19] provides a detailed analysis of the
issue of transitivity discussed in item 1 below against which
we will compare our results in Section 3.2.
More speciﬁcally, we seek a set of patterns,6 schemas
and properties in OWL that are adequate to capture ﬁve
notions and exclude as many as possible of their
counterexamples:
1. Transitive vs. non-transitive parthood—the diﬀerence
between the way skin cells of the ﬁnger are parts of
the body and the way ﬁngers themselves are part of
the body. More precisely speaking, we seek to elucidate
when the notions spoken of in biomedicine as ‘‘parts’’
are best represented by the part–whole relation as for-
mulated in mereology and when they are better repre-
sented by some subrelation or alternative relation. In
cases where a notion is better represented by an alterna-
tive relation, we seek to elucidate for each such relation
whether it is best formulated as transitive or non-
transitive.
2. The relation of faults and procedures to parts and
wholes—e.g., that the disease of the part is necessarily
a disease of the whole and that certain procedure—
e.g., repair—on a part are necessarily procedures on
the whole.
3. Patterns and characteristics of collectives e.g., that the
cells of the intestine are typically aligned (with each
other) or that the cells in bone are sparsely distributed.5 Known as ‘‘properties’’ in OWL; ‘‘roles’’ in most DLs; and ‘‘attri-
butes’’ in GRAIL.
6 See Semantic Web Best Practice and Deployment Working Group,
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/BestPractices/.4. Collective or emergent eﬀects of collectives, e.g., the
total secretion of enzymes by the liver cells or the total
force exerted by the cells in a muscle.
5. Persistent vs. non-persistent parthood—e.g., that
‘‘Jack’s ﬁnger’’ will still be referred to as ‘‘Jack’s ﬁnger’’
even when it is severed from his hand. However, insulin
secreted by a cell is not considered to be a part of that
cell.1.4. Independence of collectivity and size
1.4.1. ‘‘Collectivity’’ does not depend on physical size
Necessarily, grains are not physically larger than the
collective of which they are members (except perhaps
for some odd quantum cases). There is a tendency to talk
of things as being at, for example, the ‘‘cellular level’’ or
the ‘‘organ level’’ or the ‘‘subatomic’’ level, etc. However,
such talk indicates a general tendency and conﬂates size
and collectivity. Hairs are macroscopic entities of the
same general size as small organs, yet most of the infor-
mation we have to convey about hairs concerns the collec-
tive ‘‘hair’’ rather than individual ‘‘hairs.’’ Sperm and
eggs are both cells, but much of what we have to say
about eggs pertains to individual eggs, whereas much
more that we have to convey about sperm concern the
collective, although we need a mechanism to cross levels
of collectivity to speak of a single sperm fertilizing a sin-
gle egg. Indeed, one of the issues in fertility research is to
determine which factors depend on the collective of sperm
and the ﬂuids in which they are swimming, and which
depend on the individual sperm cells themselves. Hence,
we explicitly reject any notion of a ﬁxed set of levels of
granularity as would seem to be suggested by, for exam-
ple, Kumar et al. [20].
To extend the biological examples, within cells there are
both individual entities, such as the nucleus, and collectives
such as mitochondria and chloroplasts. Within the nucleus
there are a determinate number of chromosomes that are
usually treated individually, but an indeterminate number
of macromolecules that form collectives. Furthermore, on
occasion, the same entities may be sometimes treated col-
lectively and sometimes individually. The rigidity and
shape of a chromosome are a collective property of the
DNA molecules (and other supporting structures) that
make it up; the ‘‘genes’’7 inheritance of characteristics is
usually a feature of discrete sequences of base pairs (with
complex dependence on context and regulation).
1.4.2. ‘‘Size range’’ does not depend on collectivity
There are many eﬀects that are speciﬁc to physical size,
distance, speed, density, etc. Most obviously, quantum and
relativistic eﬀects are generally relevant only for the very
small, very large or the very rapidly moving.8 Closer to7 The deﬁnition of what constitutes a gene is problematic, at least in
eukaryotic cells, but that need not concern us here.
8 Relative to the observer of course.
Table 1
Concise inﬁx notation used in this paper with equivalents in OWL and standard DL notation
Abbreviated Informal OWL Abstract Syntax DL German Syntax
A AND B interseotionOf(A B) A u B
A OR B unionOf(A B) A t B
NOT A complementOf(A) A
has_property SOME C restriction(has_property someValuesFrom(C)) $ has_property . C
has_property ONLY C restriction(has_property allValuesFrom(C)) " has_property . C
has_property EXACTLY-1 C restriction(has_property cardinality(1, C)a $! 1 has_property . C
Bﬁ A subclassOf(B A) B v A
A subclassOf(B A) B v A
— B subclassOf(C B) C v B
— — C
AeB equivalentClass(A B) AeB
P1 propagates_via P2 not applicable P1  P2ﬁ P2
a Not supported in the current OWL standard although proposed for extensions.
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govern insects ability to ﬂy, walk on walls, skim over water,
etc. are highly relevant at their size range but almost irrel-
evant at the size of most mammals. Within biology, chem-
ical bonding, van der Waals forces, other electrostatic
forces, and many other eﬀects are important at one physi-
cal size range but not at another. When they are relevant,
they are relevant both for individuals and for collectives
that conform to that size range.
2. Semi-formal presentation
2.1. Notation
Neither of the XML concrete syntaxes for OWL is com-
pact or readable enough for easy use in a paper, and even
the oﬃcial abstract syntax becomes bulky and diﬃcult to
read when there is any signiﬁcant embedding. This paper
therefore adopts the following conventions for a simpliﬁed
syntax. In addition, this allows us to introduce syntax for
two constructs not currently standard in OWL although
likely in subsequent versions and supported by known
description logics, qualiﬁed cardinality restrictions (e.g.,
‘‘exactly-1’’) and general inclusion axioms
(‘‘propagates_via’’).9
1. Subset and subproperties are indicated by indentation
made explicit by ‘–’s. Where only two are involved a sim-
ple arrow is used, e.g., ‘‘Heartﬁ Organ’’ for ‘‘Heart
is a kind of Organ.’’9 ‘‘exactly n’’ and ‘‘propagates via’’ are special cases of the more general
constructs known as ‘‘qualiﬁed cardinality restrictions’’ and ‘‘role inclu-
sion axioms,’’ respectively. Qualiﬁed cardinality constraints are supported
by many description logics, and some OWL tools support an extension to
them. Tractable algorithms for description logics with role inclusion
axioms are known but robust implementations are not currently available.2. Properties are presented with their inverse separated by
a slash; whether the property is transitive, symmetric,
functional, etc., are listed to the right, as in Table 1
above.
3. The OWL key words are adapted to a concise inﬁx nota-
tion as shown in Table 1.
4. In complex expressions, indentation will be used rather
than bracketing wherever the meaning is clear.
5. Schema variables will be given in italics sans serif in
place of parts of names, e.g., X, Y, Z as in part_of_X.
Schema variables range over OWL class names.
In OWL as in all description logic based formalisms,
properties hold between individuals. Expressions involving
classes are always implicitly about all individuals of the
class—that all members of one class are related by the giv-
en property to some, only, at least, at most n, or exactly n
members of some other class.
2.2. Basic properties and entities
We shall assume an upper ontology similar to DOLCE
[21,22] that includes a notion of ‘‘Physical entity’’ that
includes both material entities, i.e., ‘‘Physical objects’’
and non-material entities such as holes and lines. We shall
assume a distinction between ‘‘Physical objects’’ such as
ﬁngers and statues and ‘‘Amounts of matter’’ such as skin
and clay as in DOLCE. We leave open until later the dis-
cussion of the controversy between cognitivist and realist
over the nature of the link between physical objects and
amounts of matter. However, we will take it that it is useful
to distinguish two subproperties of the parthood relation,
one between instances of ‘‘Physical objects’’ which we shall
term ‘‘determinate parthood’’ and the other between
instances of ‘‘Amounts of matter’’ which we shall call
‘‘ingredienthood.’’ The common parent of ‘‘determinate
parthood’’ and ‘‘ingredienthood’’ we shall term ‘‘gross part-
hood’’ which we shall treat as a direct subproperty of the
most general part–whole relation and a sibling of ‘‘granular
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scheme presaged in Section 1.1 but necessary to the formal-
isation.) Normally, collectives are treated as amounts of
matter. Roughly speaking, collectives of objects that are
discrete at one level of collectivity form amounts of matter
at the next. (The exception is for ‘‘determinate collectives’’
discussed in Section 4.3.) As in DOLCE we shall also
assume that the representation is atemporal,10 i.e., that it
represents entities as viewed from a single point in time,
or in the language of the BFO, in a single ‘‘snap’’ (see [23].)
The basic notions to be captured are that:
1. The parent part–whole relation, ‘‘is part of’’/‘‘has part’’
corresponds to the basic mereological relation and both
it and the two subrelations ‘‘is determinate part of’’/‘‘has
determinate part’’ and ‘‘is ingredient of’’/‘‘has ingredient’’
and their common parent ‘‘is gross part of’’/‘‘has gross
part’’ satisfy the usual mereological axioms, i.e., that
they are reﬂexive, transitive, and antisymmetric, and sat-
isfy the weak supplementation principle [24]. This means
that: (i) everything is a part of itself11; (ii) parts of parts
are parts of wholes; (iii) nothing is a part of a part of
itself, and (iv) if a part not equal to the whole is
removed, a residual is left behind.
2. The ‘‘is grain of/has grain’’ relation is irreﬂexive, anti-
symmetric, and non-transitive, i.e., that (i) nothing can
be a grain of itself; (ii) a collective cannot be a grain
of one of its own grains; and (iii) that grains of grains
of a collective are not grains of that collective.
3. The ‘‘is grain of’’ relation propagates via the ‘‘is part of’’
relation, i.e., if an entity is a grain of collective that is
part of a whole then that entity is also part of the whole.
More formally: ‘‘is grain ofﬁ is part ofﬁ is part of.’’2.3. Approximation in OWL
Owl supports transitive properties (relations) and the
notion of subproperties. It lacks the notion of propa-
gates_via (sometimes known as inheritance across tran-
sitive roles—see Section 2.2 point 3 above), but this can be
approximated by use of the role hierarchy by making
is_grain_of a subproperty of is_part_of, which is a
slightly stronger condition. This has the undesirable conse-
quence that grains, which are analogous to members of a
set, count as parts of the collective, which runs counter
to the usual usage in for example Winston and Odell [3,4].
However, in practice this causes little diﬃculty because
most classiﬁcations and queries involve the relations
is_gross_part_of or is_determinate_part_of,
both of which exclude is_grain_of. (In fact, in this case,10 A detailed discussion of time in ontologies and their use in biomedical
informatics would take us far beyond the scope of this article.
11 The usual formulation of the axiom the part–whole axioms in
mereology is in terms of what is here called ‘‘reﬂexive parthood.’’ ‘‘Proper
parthood’’ is then deﬁned as a part of the whole that is not equal to the
whole.the approximation may be an advantage as it avoids users
having to make a distinction that many subject matter
experts ﬁnd unintuitive.) OWL also lacks representations
for the notions of reﬂexive, irreﬂexive and antisymmetric
properties. The consequences of these limitations are dis-
cussed in Section 4.5. Despite these limitations, a suﬃcient
representation of part–whole relations to cover the impor-
tant positive inferences from themore general axioms is pos-
sible. A demonstration following the development in this
paper is available.12
The basic property hierarchy for the OWL approxima-
tion is presented in Table 2A using the conventions
described in Section 2.1. The additional properties of
is_gross_part_of and is_ingredient_of are
explained in Section 2.4.3. The corresponding entity hierar-
chy is presented in Table 2B.
2.4. Basic schemas
2.4.1. Deﬁning collectives
Collectives are deﬁned using universal restrictions fol-
lowing the schema below, where the upper case italics indi-
cates schema variables that range over class names.
Collective_of_X e
Collective AND has_grain ONLY X
There are two consequences of this schema:
1. Empty collectives are allowed. This is convenient when
we want to talk about concentrations of zero or things
that are empty or missing. We can deﬁne Non_emp-
ty_collective in the obvious way as: Collective
AND has_grain SOME Anything.13
2. All the grains in a collective must be of the same type.
This does not rule out collectives of a type that is a dis-
junction of other types. However, any collective deﬁned
in terms of a disjunction should be viewed with suspi-
cion, as it is more likely to be more appropriately repre-
sented as a mixture (see Section 2.4.3).2.4.2. Reﬂexive parts
Because reﬂexive properties cannot be expressed directly
in OWL, it is necessary to represent the axioms to allow the
required inferences by means of class deﬁnitions rather
than property deﬁnitions. To this end, we use a series of
schemas for ‘‘reﬂexive parts’’ which behave as mereological
parts—i.e., they include the whole and all of its parts. One
such schema is deﬁned for is_part_of and each of its
major subproperties:12 http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~rector/ontologies/collectivity/Collectivity-
demo.owl, http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~rector/ontologies/collectivity/
Collectivity-demo-classiﬁed.owl.
13
owl:Thing.
Table 2A
The property hierarchy for the OWL implementation
Property Transitive Domain/Range Comments
is_part_of/
has_part
Y Physical_entity/
Physical_entity
The generic part-whole relation Reﬂexive and
antisymmetric properties not captured directly
in OWL.
— is_gross_part_of/
has_gross_part
Y Physical_entity/
Physical_entity
The common parent (in eﬀect the disjunction)
of measurable portions and determinate parts
and other properties indicated by the ellips is
(‘‘. . .")
—— is_determinate_part_of/
has_determinate_part
Y Physical_entity/
Physical_entity
The relation between determinate parts and
wholes, e.g., ﬁngers and hands.
—— is_portion_of/
has_Dortion
Y Amount_of_matter/
Amount_of_matter
The relation between the water in the bay and the
water in the lake. See Section 2.4.3
—— is_ingredient_of/
has_ingredient
Y Amount_of_matter/
Amount_of_matter
The relation between plasma and blood.
—— . . . See Section 2.4.4 and Table 3.
— is_grain_of/
has_grain
N Physical_object/
Collective
The relation between a grain and the collective.
Represented as a subproperty of is_part_of in
OWL as an approximation of propagates_via
see Sections 2.2, item 3 and 2.3.
Table 2B
The high level entity hierarchy for the OWL implementation
Class Use in this paper Comments
Physical_entity Domain/range of is_part_of and
is_determinate_part_of
Common ancestor of all physical entities
— Physical_object Domain for is_grain_of Material physical entities
— Non_material_object Excluded from domain for is_grain_of Non-material physical entities, e.g., holes, lines, etc.
— Amount_of_matter Range for is_ingredient_of Amounts of ‘‘stuﬀ’, roughly corresponding to mass nouns. (NB the
Relation between Physical_object and Amount_of_matter
depends on the debate between the cognitivist & realist stance and
is not directly relevant to this paper. See Section 4.3)
—— Mixture Domain for is_ingredient_of Abstract including solutions, suspensions, etc.
Collective Range of is_grain_of Whether or notCollectives are considered physical andwhether
or not they are to be disjoint from Physical_object, is deferred.
See Sections 4.3 and 4.4.3.
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X OR is_part_of SOME X
Reflexive_gross_part_of_X e
X OR is_gross_part_of SOME X
Reflexive_determinate_part_of_X e
X OR is_determinate_part_of SOME XWhich schema is appropriate depends on the require-
ment. In simple ‘‘part explosions’’ only determinate parts
are required, for example an explosion of the parts of a
car would normally only be expected to include the deter-
minate parts—e.g., body, motor, wheels, etc. If both con-
stituents—e.g., steel and rubber14—as well as determinate
parts are needed (see ‘‘Mixtures’’ below), then Reflex-
ive_gross_part_of_X is required. If all parts are need-
ed, including granular parts as in the Digital Anatomist14 Strictly speaking we should say ‘‘Steel that is part of car’’ and ‘‘rubber
that is part of car’’ since not all steel nor all rubber is part of a car.Foundational Model of Anatomy [8] where cells and even
macromolecules are counted as parts, then the most gener-
al notion of Reflexive_part_of_X is required.
These schemas also make it easy to express constructs
related to Schulz and Hahn’s SEP Triples [25–27]. Schulz
and Hahn transform partonomies in order to make infer-
ence over part–whole reasoning require only less expressive
description logics. In their transformation, each original
entity becomes a triple of three nodes termed the ‘‘Struc-
ture’’ (‘‘S’’), ‘‘Entity’’ (‘‘E’’), and ‘‘Part’’ (‘‘P’’) nodes. In
terms of the above schemas, for each entity X, the ‘‘reﬂexive
part’’ corresponds to the ‘‘Structure’’ (‘‘S’’) node and X
itself to the ‘‘Entity’’ (‘‘E’’) node. The ‘‘Part’’ (‘‘P’’) node
can be represented by the schema: is_part_of SOME X,
i.e., all the proper parts of the entity X.
2.4.3. Mixtures
Collectives and reﬂexive parts provide the basic mecha-
nisms required, but almost all interesting cases involving
collectives involve not just one collective but mixtures of
collectives with other collectives and/or amounts of matter.
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of matter’’ in DOLCE’s terminology—i.e., e.g., a ‘‘Collec-
tive of cells’’ is treated as an ‘‘Amount of cells’’ by analogy
to the ‘‘Amount of clay’’ that makes up the statue or the
‘‘Amount of plasma’’ in blood. (The exceptions are dis-
cussed in Section 4.3.) There are two further subrelations
the parthood relation with respect to ‘‘amounts of mat-
ter’’—‘‘portions’’ and ‘‘ingredients.’’ Roughly, portions
are separable and analogous to determinate parts—e.g.,
the portion of the water in the lake that is in the bay, the
portion of milk poured into the pitcher, etc. For purposes
of this paper, every portion of a mixture will be considered
to have the same ingredients in the same proportions, i.e.,
we will consider only homogeneous mixtures. (An account
of non-homogeneous mixtures is beyond the scope of this
paper.) We place is_ingredient_of and is_portio-
n_of as siblings of is_determinate_part_of and
under is_gross_part_of because some classes and que-
ries to be formulated include all three, e.g., the gross parts
of a car include both wheels and rubber; the gross parts of
the arm include both the biceps and fascia.15
The basic schema for mixtures is:
Amount_of_Mixture_of_X1_and_X2_and_.. ._and_Xne
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_ingredient SOME X1 AND
has_ingredient SOME X2 AND. . .
. . .AND
has_ingredient SOME Xn
Formally, the domain constraint on is_ingredient_of
guarantees in this simple version that anything that has
portions is a mixture. However, for clarity it is better to
include Mixture as a conjunct explicitly. A Mixture can
be deﬁned by being an amount of matter that has
ingredients.16
Amount_of_Mixture e
Amount_of_matter AND
has_ingredient SOME Amount_of_matter
For example, one might represent that blood is a mix-
ture of—amongst other things—plasma, red cells and white
cells:
Amount_of_blood ﬁ
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_ingredient SOME Amount_of_plasma AND
has_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND has_grain ONLY White_blood_cell)
AND
has_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND has_grain ONLY Red_blood_cell)15 Again, strictly speaking we should say ‘‘rubber that is part of the car’’
and ‘‘fascia of the biceps.’’
16 A given ontology might, for consistency, wish to insist that all amounts
of matter were mixtures. That issue is deferred here.Note that, in common with most biomedical deﬁnitions,
we have not closed the list of ingredients in the mixture.
There is nothing in the above axiom to imply that blood does
not contain other things, only that it does contain the ingre-
dients mentioned. Nor have we made this a deﬁnition, mere-
ly an implication, as indicated by the use of the symbol ‘‘ﬁ’’
rather than ‘‘e’; it does not imply that any mixture of plas-
ma, red cells, and white cells is blood, only that all blood is a
mixture of plasma, red cells, and white cells.
The above implication likewise leaves open the question
as to whether blood with a no white cells or no red cells is
still blood. If we wish to represent an implication that
requires the collectives to be non-empty, then we can
expand the above to:
Amount_of_blood ﬁ
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_ingredient SOME Amount_of_plasma AND
has_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND has_grain ONLY White_blood_cell AND
has_grain SOME White_blood_cell)
AND
has_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND has_grain ONLY Red_blood_cell AND
has_grain SOME Red_blood_cell)
However, even this formulation requires only that there
be at least one of each kind of cell. For a further discussion
of sized of collectives see Section 4.3.2.
In most situations we want the mixture to consist of just
one portion of each kind of ingredient. This can be done if
qualiﬁed cardinality restrictions are supported.17 We need
simply say that there is exactly one amount or collective
of each kind as follows:
Amount_of_blood ﬁ
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_ingredient exactly-1 Amount_of_plasma AND
has_ingredient exactly-1
(Collective AND has_grain ONLY White_blood_cell) AND
has_ingredient exactly-1
(Collective AND has_grain ONLY Red_blood_cell)
There are a number of other axioms linking portions
and ingredients that are discussed brieﬂy in Section 4.5
but which are largely outside the scope of this paper.
2.4.4. Proportions
The relative amounts in a mixture are so often important,
and the means of determining relative amounts vary—e.g.,
by weight, volume, activity, etc. Therefore, in a binary rela-17 ‘‘Qualiﬁed cardinality restrictions’’—the ablity to say exactly 1 of a
class, at least one of a class, at most one of a class, etc.—were omitted in
the ﬁnal editing of the OWL standard. They are supported by essentially
all reasoners used for OWL-DL, many tools, and are likely to be
reinstated at the ﬁrst revision of the standard.
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ate to reify the relation has_ingredient, i.e., to re-repre-
sent it as a class—which we shall term Proportion—plus
three new subproperties—which we shall term has_pro-
portion, is_of_ingredient, and has_percentage.
The schema then becomes that a mixture consists of a set of
ingredients related to the mixture by proportions. (NB: Do
not confuse ‘‘proportions’’ with ‘‘portions.’’ Despite the sim-
ilarity of the words, the notions are completely diﬀerent. A
‘‘Portion’’ is an ‘‘Amount of matter’’; A ‘‘Proportion’’ is a
reiﬁed relation between two amounts of matter, one the
ingredient of the other, in some speciﬁc ratio18—see Section
2.4.5.) If we include a property of the ‘‘Proportion’’ to repre-
sent the ratio in the relationship, e.g., the percentage as
weight per unit volume represented for brevity by
has_percentage,19 the basic schema becomes:
Amount_of_Mixture_of_X1_and_X2_and_. . ._and_Xn e
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME X1 AND
has_percentage VALUE p1) AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME X2 AND
has_percentage VALUE p2) AND
. . .AND. . .
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME Xn AND
has_percentage VALUE pn)
The example of blood extended to this schema therefore
becomes:
Amount_of_blood ﬁ:
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME Plasma AND
has_percentage VALUE p1) AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND
is_of_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND
has_grain ONLY White_blood_cell) AND
has_percentage VALUE p2)) AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND
is_of_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND
has_grain ONLY Red_blood_cell) AND
has_percentage VALUE p3))18 A complete account would require dealing with the measure of the
ratio, e.g., by mass, by volume, by number, etc. However, this would add
undue complexity here.
19 A complete exposition of the quantitative aspects of proportions
would involve a lengthy diversion into issues around quantities and units
and is omitted here.where the pi are, in this example, appropriate weight per
unit volume concentration quantities. Other such proper-
ties of the proportion can be represented by analogy. Note
that, as always when reifying properties, care must be taken
with cardinalities so that a given Proportion can pertain
to exactly one Amount_of_Mixture and exactly one
ingredient.20
2.4.5. Allowing proportions and simple ingredients to coexist
It is possible to allow the two patterns—for simple
ingredients and for proportions of ingredients—to coexist
if we arrange the property hierarchy as shown in Table 3.
Given this arrangement, to say that an mixture has a pro-
portion of some ingredient is to imply that it has that ingre-
dient i.e., that the OWL schema below always holds:
Amount_of_matter AND has_proportion SOME
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME X) ﬁ
Amount_of_matter has_ingredient SOME X.
The fact that proportions of proportions are not them-
selves the same proportions of the whole is reﬂected in
the facts that has_proportion and is_of_ingredi-
ent are not transitive. Since the percentages attached to
each proportion will have to be recalculated at each step
down the chain, the relationship is not simply transitive
but follows a more complex rule. That rule must be han-
dled by reasoning mechanisms outside the scope of OWL
or most other ontology languages. What can be captured
in OWL is that ingredients of ingredients, by either mech-
anism, are ingredients of the whole, which is represented by
the fact that the parent property, has_ingredient, is
transitive.
2.4.6. Characteristics of collectives and patterns of
collectives in mixtures
2.4.6.1. Characteristics of the collective itself. Members of a
collective often have collective characteristics, e.g., that the
cells of a tissue are aligned or that the atoms of a crystal
form a particular lattice structure, that neurons ﬁre syn-
chronously or asynchronously, etc. Such characteristics
pertain to the collective; they make no sense if applied to
its individual grains. Nor do these characteristics depend
on the collective’s relation to any other entity of which it
may be a part. Furthermore, just as collective’s identity is
not extensional, their characteristics are not universal over
their extensions, i.e., they can be considered true even if
they do not apply to every member of the collective, e.g.,
a crystal will still be said to have a particular alignment20 In OWL, this is represented by declaring has_proportion to be
inverse functional—i.e., that its inverse is single-valued—and declaring
is_ingredient_of to be functional—i.e., single valued. See Deﬁning
N-ary Relations on the Semantic Web: Use With Individuals, Natasha
Noy and Alan Rector, Editors’ Draft, Semantic Web Best Practice
Working Group, http://www.w3.org/TR/swbp-n-aryRelations/.
Table 3
Property hierarchy reconciling ingredients and proportions
Property Transitive Domain/Range Comments
is_ingredient_of/has_ingredient Y Amount_of_matter/Amount_of_matter OR
Proportion_of_matter
Ingredients of ingredients are ingredients
of the whole.
— of_mixture/has_proportion N Proportion/Amount_of_matter Proportions of proportions are not
proportions of the whole.
— is_proportion/is_of_ingredient N Amount_of_matter/Proportion
Note that the relevant properties are the inverses (given in bold) to remain consistent with Table 2A.
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such characteristics as properties of the collective,22 e.g.
Collective AND
has_grain ONLY Cell AND
has_pattern SOME Alignment
2.4.6.2. Characteristics of the collective in relation to other
entities.On the other hand, there are characteristics that per-
tain to the relation between a collective and other items in a
mixture—e.g., that cells are suspended in plasma or that the
water and alcohol molecules are intermingled in a miscible
liquid. In this case the properties are best represented as addi-
tional characteristics of the Proportion, e.g.
Amount_of_blood ﬁ:
Amount_of_Mixture AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME Plasma
AND has_percentage VALUE p1
AND has_role SOME Suspensor_role) AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND
has_grain ONLY White_blood_cell)
AND has_percentage VALUE p2
AND has_role SOME Suspensee_role)) AND
has_proportion EXACTLY-1
(Proportion AND is_of_ingredient SOME
(Collective AND
has_grain ONLY Red_ blood_cell)
AND has_percentage VALUE p3
AND has_role SOME Suspensee_role))
The form above is chosen over a representation in the
spirit of ‘‘Blood is plasma in which are suspended red
and white cells’’ since this variant has the undesired impli-
cation that ‘‘Blood is a kind of Plasma’’—a statement that
is clearly false.21 How completely such characteristics are true belongs with a discussion
of fuzziness or precision and is beyond the scope of this paper.
22 For a discussion of the use of classes in value partitions, see Semantic
Web Best Practice Committee’s note http://www.w3.org/TR/swbp-
speciﬁed-values/.2.4.7. Emergent eﬀects of collectives
Each cell in most glands secretes a portion of the hor-
mone or other substance secreted; each granule in a syn-
apse releases a portion of the neurotransmitter that ﬁres
the synapse; each muscle ﬁbre exerts a measurable force
when it contracts; each strand of a cable has its own ten-
sile strength. However, in each of these cases, the infor-
mation of interest is almost always about the collective
eﬀect. The collective eﬀect is a function of the individual
eﬀects, but may be so highly non-linear that it would be
diﬃcult to predict, even if all the individual eﬀects were
known. The function is also highly variable for diﬀerent
collectives. Consider for example the diﬀerent relation-
ships between the collective strength of chains with
respect to their links and of cables with respect to their
strands. Furthermore, in many cases such as cables,
minor changes in the eﬀects of individual grains (i.e.,
strands) are irrelevant provided the collective eﬀect
remains unchanged.
Emergent eﬀects are dealt with straightforwardly by
schemas such as:
(Collective_X AND has_grain ONLY Entity_Y)ﬁ
has_effect Effect_Z
A simple example would be:
(Collective AND
has_grain ONLY Pancreatic_islet_cell) ﬁ
has_effect SOME (Secretion AND
has_target SOME Insulin AND
has_rate VALUE r)
where r is a quantity with a numeric magnitude and units
of type volume per unit time or weight per unit time.
The concern is not with the rate of secretion of individ-
ual islet cells, or indeed of individual islets, but with the
rate of secretion of the entire collective of islet cells.
3. Use and consequences
3.1. Propagation of faults
In general, faults propagate only across gross parthood,
e.g., disorder to the liver is usually considered as a disorder
of the digestive system, body, etc., whereas we would not
normally consider a disorder of a single liver cell in this
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the liver (whether or not via a constitutes relation). Likewise,
while we would consider a disorder of the metabolism of all,
or a signiﬁcant portion of, red cells—e.g., sickle cell anae-
mia—as a disorder of blood, we would not consider a disor-
der of the metabolism of a single red cell as a disorder of
blood. Indeed, since both liver and red blood cells constantly
die and are replenished, were we to consider the state of indi-
vidual cells, all organisms would suﬀer from liver and blood
disorders, which is clearly nonsense.
Hence the schema for disorders is normally
Disorder_of_X e
Disorder has_locus SOME Reflexive_gross_part_of_X
where has_locus is the property linking disorders to their
anatomical or functional ‘‘site.’’ This captures the above
two examples and analogous cases while excluding the case
of damage to individual cells, etc. It is a slight adaptation
of the method of SEP triples introduced by Schulz and
Hahn [25,28].
Note that the issue of propagation across boundaries of
collectivity is orthogonal to the issue of whether the disorder
applies to the entity as a whole or to its reﬂexive parts. There
are disorders—gastritis, inﬂammatory bowel disease, septi-
caemia (infection of the blood), etc. that refer to the whole
taken as a whole rather than its parts. For these cases, the
appropriate schema excludes all parts, whether gross or
granular:
Disorder_of_X_as_a_whole e
Disorder has_locus SOME X.
Furthermore, the issue is not dependent on size. Analo-
gies can be found at all physical size ranges.
3.2. Transitivity of part–whole relations
The issue of propagation of faults is closely related to
the issue of when best to represent the biomedical notions
of parthood by transitive or non-transitive subrelations of
is_part_of. Eﬀectively, the argument in this paper is
that most cases where the best representation is a non-tran-
sitive relation involve transitions across levels of collectivi-
ty, i.e., they involve chains of reasoning that include the
is_grain_of relation, which is not transitive. Confusion
arises because our usual language does not distinguish the
broader is_part_of relation from its more specialised
subrelations, here termed is_gross_part_of and
is_grain_of. The is_grain_of relation marks
boundaries between levels of collectivity, or what are often
called levels of granularity. However, we argue that the
critical issue of whether a transitive or non-transitive
subrelation should be used to represent parthood in a par-
ticular case is not one of physical size, per se, but of
whether or not the subrelation deals with collectives or
individuals.As a partial validation of this view, consider the list of
cases provided by Johansson of anomalies where the
appropriate relation to reprsent parthood is not considered
to be transitive [19]. Table 4 lists these issues and whether
or not they are accounted for by the distinction between
gross parthood and granular parthood.
We would argue that cases 4–8 and 11–12) are clearly
accounted for by the distinction between gross and granu-
lar parthood.
Of the remainder, for cases 1 and 2, Johansson puts for-
ward the argument that there is a narrow, non-transitive
subproperty of parthood, which we usually term ‘‘direct
parthood,’’ that is not transitive and that the problem aris-
es out of a confusion of the direct subproperty and the par-
ent transitive property. He draws support for this
distinction from Simons [29] and Casati and Varzi [30].
This seems to us entirely correct. However, Johansson also
includes case 3 in this category. We would argue that it was
better accounted for by the distinction between gross and
granular parthood. We might even stretch the issue to case
2, and claim that it demonstrates that platoons are better
treated as granular than determinate parts.
Case 9 Johannson explains by noting that two notions
of parthood being used are fundamentally diﬀerent. Again
we would agree, a point we would signify by the incompat-
ibility of parthood for occurrents and continuants, i.e.,
‘‘eating’’ and ‘‘spoon.’’
Case 10 is dealt with cursorily but seems clearly to raise
a host of questions, not least whether the shard per se exist-
ed prior to the shattering of the plate. Such cases cannot be
dealt with in the context of an atemporal representation
such as that used in this paper.
Johansson’s thesis is that intransitive parthood predi-
cates are not binary predicates. Our argument is that for
the cases where it applies, the distinction between gross
and granular parthood—i.e., between parthood within lev-
els of collectivity and parthood across levels of collectivi-
ty—is simpler, easier to apply, and arguably more
fundamental.
3.3. Persistent and non-persistent part-hood
It is a general pattern that things continue to be spoken
of as ‘parts’ even after they have been separated from the
whole. Thus, we speak of ‘‘John’s ﬁnger’’ even after it
has been amputated. Even if it has failed to develop we
may speak of it as being absent. By contrast, we do not
speak of the secretions from an individual cell as remaining
part of that cell, although we might speak of them as being
from an organ or tissue. Hence we might legitimately seek
to distinguish, for example, testosterone produced by the
adrenal gland from testosterone produced by the testes,
or oestrogen from the ovary from oestrogen from adipose
tissue. However, we would be unlikely to distinguish testos-
terone originating from individual cells. Likewise, although
we might talk of the ‘‘piece of John’s liver’’ or ‘‘cells from
John’s liver’’ following a biopsy, we would be unlikely to
Table 4
Johansson’s list of cases for non-transitivity of part-whole relations
1. A handle, x, can be part of a doer, y, and a door can be part of a house,
z, but yet the handle need not be (is not) a part of the house. That is,
‘x < y’ and ‘y < z’ but ‘(x < z)’. (Of course, ‘part’ cannot here and
elsewhere in the list be synonymous with ‘spatial part’.)
Not accounted for: confusion of direct and indirect partonomy.
2. A platoon is part of a company, and a company is part of a battalion,
but yet a platoon is not part of a battalion.
Possibly accounted for: Is a platoon a grain or a part of a company?
3. A cell’s nucleus is part of a cell, and a cell is part of an organ, but yet the
nucleus is not part of an organ.
Accounted for. Cells are granular parts of the organ, not gross parts.
4. Heart cells are parts of the heart, and the heart is part of the circulatory
system, but yet the cells are not parts of the circulatory system.
Accounted for. Cells are granular parts of the Heart, not gross parts.
5. Person P is part (member) of the football club FC, and FC is part
(member) of the National Association of Football Clubs, NAFC, but
yet P is not a part (member) of NAFC.
Accounted for. The person is a grain (member) of the football club, not a
part of it and, similarly, the football club is a grain (member) of the
association.
6. Simpson’s ﬁnger is part of Simpson, and Simpson is part of the
Philosophy Department, but yet Simpson’s ﬁnger is not part of the
Philosophy Department.
Accounted for. Simpson is a member (grain) of the philosophy department
(or possibly in some other relation to it), but not ‘‘part’’ of it in the sense
used here.
7. Hydrogen is part of water, and water is part of our cooling system, but
yet hydrogen is not part of our cooling system.
Accounted for and a false example. Hydrogen is not part of water.
Hydrogen atoms are part of water molecules, collectives of which constitute
water used in the cooling system
8. Cellulose is part of trees, and trees are parts of forests, but yet cellulose
is not part of forests.
Accounted for. Trees are grains for forests.
9. A handle is part of a spoon, and a spoon is part of eating soup, but yet a
handle is not part of eating soup.
Not accounted for; A diﬀerent issue. Continuants and occurrents cannot be
parts of each other for reasons not discussed in this paper.
10. This shard was part of a plate, and the plate was part of a dinner service,
but yet the shard was not part of the dinner service.
Odd case not accounted for. An adequate discussion requires consideration
of time. It is unclear whether or not the shards existed prior to the
shattering of the plate.
11. This tree is part of the Black forest, and the Black forest is part of
Germany, but yet this tree is not part of Germany.
Accounted for. Trees are grains of forests. (Also the notion of geographical
parthood might be treated diﬀerently by some authors)
12. These grains of sand are part of the beach, and the beach is part of the
island, but yet these grains of sand are not part of the island.
Accounted for. The grains of sand are grains of the beach.
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missing, in the same sense as we would his amputated ﬁn-
ger or even the ‘‘piece of John’s liver.’’
As in the above cases, we would argue that ‘‘persistent
parthood’’ is something that pertains to things arising from
gross parts but not from granular parts. This point, we
accept, remains somewhat speculative and requires further
investigation. (Note, we ﬁnd ‘‘persistent parthood’’ as used
here closer to common clinical usage than ‘‘permanent
parthood’’ as advocated in Smith et al. [7]).
4. Discussion
4.1. Biomedical cases
4.1.1. Tissues and substances
A major motivation for the current work is to deal with
speciﬁc problems in the adequate representation of the bio-
logical notions of tissue and substance. In this formulation
both are ‘‘mixtures’’ some of whose ‘‘ingredients’’ are ‘‘col-
lectives.’’23 The schemas oﬀered here provide both for
properties that are intrinsic to the collective—e.g. arrange-
ments and patterns—and for properties of the relation of
the collective to the rest of the mixture, e.g., the propor-23 The label ‘‘ingredient’’ is perhaps not ideal here. No better has yet been
suggested, but the authors are open to suggestions.tion, distribution, etc. The claim is not that tissues are col-
lectives, but that they are best viewed as amounts of matter
some of whose ingredients are collectives.
However, the schema for proportions and mixtures giv-
en here is limited in complex cases, e.g., where one might
want to say that the water plays the role of solute for sodi-
um but suspensor for cells. In this case there would need to
be two diﬀerent roles for the same substance.
Note that for this purpose it would be necessary to reify
Proportions even in a formalism supporting n-ary rela-
tions. Since there are an arbitrary number of ways by
which a given proportion might be characterised, any ﬁxed
arity relation capturing only a ﬁxed number of such char-
acteristics would almost certainly become inadequate as
the ontology evolved.
Much work remains to be done to describe patterns
within tissues, but the schemas given provide a starting
point. The ‘‘Mixture’’ and the ‘‘proportion’’ are suitable
reiﬁed entities to be described—although one might want
to change the labelling of the entities we here call ‘‘propor-
tions’’ to indicate the wider range of information potential-
ly expressed about them.
4.1.2. Why do current bio ontologies not make the distinction
between granular and determinate parts?
An obvious question is: ‘‘If the distinction between
determinate and granular parthood is so important, why
is it not already standard?’’ The simplest answer is that
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required or used to support inferences that require this
distinction.
In the Foundational Model of Anatomy [8,31], the dis-
tinction is preﬁgured by the notion of ‘‘constituent parts.’’
However, the FMA is based exclusively on structure rather
than function, so that the issue of emergent eﬀects does not
arise. Even when dealing with structure, the FMA does not
represent attributes that apply to collectives such as the
alignment of cells in the mucosa of the intestine (although
the example is due to Cornelius Rosse.24) Likewise, the
FMA does not support detailed cardinality with respect
to parts, so the distinction between ﬁxed numbers of
parts—e.g., ﬁngers—and indeterminate numbers of
parts—e.g., cells—does not arise. However, these limita-
tions do present diﬃculties. The issue of the status of tis-
sues and their structure is a signiﬁcant problem and has,
for example, plagued discussions in the SAEL consor-
tium25 in its eﬀorts to reconcile various anatomic represen-
tations in mouse and man. The notions in this paper
provide a framework for representing a number of the
important notions raised in those discussions and a route
towards reconciliation of some of the controversies.
In principle, the OpenGALEN ontology supports the
distinction between collectives (termed ‘‘multiples’’) and
determinate parts (termed ‘‘components’’). However, in
practice it has usually been elided. The prime use for Open-
GALEN has been for deﬁning surgical procedures and the
drug actions and usages. In the ﬁrst case attention is con-
ﬁned to determinate parts; in the second, almost exclusively
to granular parts (e.g., receptors). In very few cases is there
room for confusion; hence the lack of distinction has not
proved troublesome. Were the OpenGALEN model to be
extended to include stronger modelling of physiology and
function, then it is almost certain that the distinctions pre-
sented in this paper would become critical.
In SNOMED-CT, the primary use for anatomy is for
the site, or locus, of diseases and the target of surgical
and other interventions. Both uses are predominantly on
the level of gross anatomy where collective eﬀects are
uncommon. Although this mean that in SNOMED,
notions such as ‘‘hair loss’’ must be deﬁned as being liter-
ally ‘‘loss of at least one hair’’ rather than ‘‘a collective
of hairs’’ (above some fuzzy threshold in size), in practice
no inferences or issues of classiﬁcation within SNOMED
itself turn on such detailed representations.
Does this neglect of the distinction between determinate
and granular parts mean that the distinction is purely ‘‘ac-
ademic’’? We believe not. It merely reﬂects the current state
of the art whereby representations are typically restricted
to a single level of ‘‘collectivity,’’ or if you prefer,
‘‘granularity.’’24 Private communication, 2004.
25 http://www.sofg.org/sael/.As the demand for stronger functional representation
across ‘‘levels of granularity’’ grows, including through
the interoperation of extant ‘single level’ ontologies, so
too will the need for a precise language to describe individ-
ual and collective eﬀects and to distinguish them from
eﬀects of physical size.
4.2. Collectives and normalisation of ontologies
To support modularisation and maintenance, a major
goal of the OpenGALEN ontologies is to maintain a ‘‘nor-
malised’’ structure in their implementation in which all
primitives form disjoint trees and all multiple classiﬁcation
is the result of inference rather than assertion [32]. The
schemas put forward here all lend themselves to normalisa-
tion in this sense. At least in its cognitivist/multiplicative
versions, the diﬀerent aspects of each entity are clearly fac-
tored so that they can be described independently.
4.3. Cognitivist vs. Realist/Multiplicative vs. unitary
representation
4.3.1. ‘‘Amounts of matter’’ and ‘‘Physical objects’’:
the ‘‘constitutes’’ relationship
The discussion so far has made no link between entities
of type Amount_of_matter and entities of type
Physical_object. This relation is a matter of contro-
versy between the cognitivist/multiplicative view represent-
ed by Guarino and Welty in OntoClean and DOLCE
[22,33,34] and Smith and his colleagues’ realist/unitary
view in the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) [35,36]. The
authors are split between these two traditions. Fundamen-
tally, given a ‘‘Statue made of clay,’’ Guarino and Welty’s
cognitivist/multiplicative view is that there are two
entities—a ‘‘Statue’’ and an ‘‘Amount of clay’’—and that
the ‘‘‘Amount of clay’ constitutes the ‘Statue’.’’ Smith’s
realist/unitary view is that there is a single entity and that
the ‘‘‘Amount of clay’ is the ‘Statue,’’’ or more precisely
that the ‘‘‘Amount of clay’ is (during some time span) the
‘Statue’.’’ In the formulation presented here, ‘‘collectives’’
are treated as ‘‘amounts of matter’’ with the exception of
‘‘determinate collectives’’ (see Section 4.3.2).
4.3.2. Number of entities in collectives: empty, small, and
determinate collectives
From a cognitivist, or perhaps better termed ‘‘informa-
tionalist,’’ viewpoint, there is no problem with empty col-
lectives. There is information to be conveyed about
them—that they are empty—therefore it is appropriate to
represent them. Likewise, the number of grains in a non-
empty collective is irrelevant to whether or not it can be
considered a collective. If there is information to be con-
veyed about the collective properties of some entities, it is
irrelevant that, in a particular case, there happen to be only
a few, one, or even no grains in the collective.
This view also means that there is no problem with the
notion of ‘‘determinate collective.’’ ‘‘Collectives’’ have been
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number of grains. There are, however, collective eﬀects of
determinate collections of entities—the collective grip of
the ﬁngers, acuity of the eyes, the total capacity of the
plates in a dinner service, etc. Note that in each of these
cases, the collective eﬀect is not determined by the precise
number of grains in the collective even though there may
be a ‘normative’ number. For example, a grip has strength
whether one or more ﬁngers is missing (or indeed a super-
numerary ﬁnger were present), a person’s visual acuity is
typically recorded whether a person has one or two func-
tioning eyes, as being the best visual acuity with all the
available eyes.
From the point of view of the formal theory, there need
be nothing to prevent the same entity being a determinate
and granular part of the same whole, indeed to impose such
a constraint would signiﬁcantly increase the complexity of
the axiomatization. From the cognitivist or ‘‘information-
alist’’ perspective there is no problem—there is distinct
information to be conveyed both about the collective and
the individual entities that comprise it, hence it is appropri-
ate to represent them separately. However, for the realist,
having both the collective and the grains poses as separate
entities would seem to pose the same problem as having the
clay and the statue as separate entities. A realist must rec-
oncile collective and deterministic parthood without intro-
ducing multiple entities apparently occupying the same
space and time.
From either point of view, determinate collectives are
the exception to the rule that collectives are treated anal-
ogously with ‘‘amounts of matter.’’ For example, it
seems odd to say that ‘‘the ﬁngers constitute (part of)
the hand’’ in the same way that ‘‘skin cells constitute
(a portion of) the skin of the hand.’’ A fully adequate
handling of determinate collectives remains an unre-
solved issue.
Most other issues discussed in this paper are largely
independent of this controversy. For purposes of this paper
and presentation in OWL, the factorisation provided by
the cognitivist/multiplicative view is clearer and briefer,
so we shall adopt it here and in the illustrative ontologies
on the Web. To do so requires adding the relation con-
stitutes/is_constituted_by to Table 2A at the
point marked by the ellipsis (‘‘. . .’’) as one of the additional
kinds of ‘‘gross parthood’’ and a sibling of is_portio-
n_of/has_portion. The domain of constitutes is
Physical_object, and the range is Amount_of_mat-
ter. Since the domain and range are diﬀerent, and in most
formulations disjoint, constitutes/is_constitut-
ed_by is non-transitive.
4.4. Other unresolved issues
4.4.1. Identity of collectives
If the identity or equivalence of collectives is not deter-
mined extensionally as for mathematical sets, how is it to
be determined? We present no complete answer to thisproblem. From a cognitivist or informationalist point of
view the problem is manageable: two collectives are the
same if there is the same, or a continuation of the same,
information to be conveyed about them; they are diﬀerent
if there is diﬀerent information to be conveyed about them.
Under what circumstances can the collective of red cells in
my blood be considered to be the same entity to have pre-
served their identity (i.e., to be the same entity) even
though the individual grains (i.e., cells) may have been
completely replaced? This issue is particularly important
with respect to Guarino and Welty’s DOLCE ontology
and OntoClean methodology [33] because they distinguish-
es between categories according to whether or not they
‘‘carry identity.’’ Hence, in DOLCE what sort of thing
the category ‘‘Collective’’ is considered to be depends on
whether and under what circumstances individual collec-
tives can be said to preserve their identity. Likewise the issue
of identity is important in the Smith’s Basic Formal Ontolo-
gy [35,36] because it seeks to track the lifetime of entities over
time.However, as stated in the introduction, in practical use,
e.g., to support terminologies andmedical records,most bio-
medical ontologies are largely atemporal. They seek only to
represent the view from a particular point in time. Issues of
identity and continuity over time are normally be dealt with
by separate reasoning mechanisms outside the ontology,
e.g., by ‘‘temporal abstraction’’ [37]. Hence, for ontologies
intended for such use, the issue of a precise deﬁnition of iden-
tity is less critical and perhaps moot.
4.4.2. Operations on collectives
The most common requirement for operations on collec-
tives is for variants of union and ﬂattening. The collective
of members of several collectives—e.g., the cells in the skin
of the thumb and foreﬁnger—can be easily expressed. Like-
wise, where collectives are nested, the ﬂattened version can
be easily captured—e.g., the collective of all cells in the col-
lective of pancreatic islets. Although logically possible, the
authors have encountered no practical applications requir-
ing intersections of collectives.
4.4.3. Are collectives of physical entities physical? Material?
Whether non-empty collectives of physical entities
should or should not count as physical has been deliberate-
ly left open in this paper. Likewise, it is left open whether
empty collectives should be material or non-material—
i.e., physical objects (material) as opposed to holes, cor-
ners, etc. (non-material). Because the schema for collectives
uses ‘‘only’’ (allValuesFrom) rather than ‘‘some’’
(someValuesFrom), it is perfectly reasonable to assert
axioms of the form, for example, that ‘‘all collectives of
only physical entities are physical’’ and that ‘‘all non-empty
collectives of only physical entities are material.’’ These
axioms seem both natural and helpful in biological applica-
tions. Similarly, it seems natural to treat empty collectives
of only physical entities as non-material, analogous to
holes. To what degree such axioms would generalise to
other domains remains to be seen.
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The entire presentation in this paper is atemporal. This
corresponds to the common situation in health informatics
in which temporal relationships are expressed in informa-
tion or decision support models rather than the ‘ontology.’
Temporal considerations have been introduced only exter-
nal to the formal representation for notions such as ‘‘per-
sistent parthood.’’ A thorough integration of temporal
considerations is a major undertaking.
4.5. Representation in OWL: Loss over a full ﬁrst order
theory
The primary goal of this paper is to provide a basis for a
representation in description logics and OWL in particular.
These languages are deliberately limited with respect to
ﬁrst order logic in order to make them computationally
tractable. What is lost in the reduction?
1. The inability to represent irreﬂexive and antisymmetric
properties means that certain incorrect representations
cannot be excluded (inferred to be unsatisﬁable). If
one is willing to accept that no collective can be a
grain of another collective without being an ingredient
of something else—a desirable restriction in our for-
mulation, then the eﬀect of the irreﬂexivity of
is_grain_of can be obtained by making its domain
NOT Collective and its range Collective. No
such solution is possible for antisymmetry, so ontolo-
gies represented in OWL cannot exclude cycles in the
part–whole relationship, although cycles can be
checked for by separate tools.
2. The inability to represent reﬂexive properties requires
making ‘‘proper parthood’’ primitive deﬁning the usual
‘‘reﬂexive parthood’’ via schemas as described in Section
2.4.2.
3. The lack of ‘‘qualiﬁed cardinality constraints’’ including
‘‘EXACTLY-n’’ means that it is usually most expedient
to approximate the relation between ingredients and
wholes by simple existential restrictions. In theory this
means that the formal model cannot exclude having
two identical ingredients. This issue should eventually
disappear as qualiﬁed cardinality constraints are expect-
ed to be included in future versions of OWL and are
already supported by some tools.
4. The lack of a construct for propagates_via construct
allowing ‘inheritance’ across transitive properties,
means that is_grain_of/has_grain must be repre-
sented as a subproperty of is_part_of/has_part
(see Section 2.2, item 3).
5. The fact that OWL is strictly binary relational and lacks
any construct to say that two values must be the same26
has at least three consequences:26 Known as ‘‘role value maps’’ in description logics.(5a) Many constructs must be represented by schemas
rather than axioms, the schema variables taking
the role of the required extra variable, Reflex-
ive_part_of_X. Unless well supported by tools,
the resulting ontologies are cluttered with many
instances of the schema that obscure its underlying
structure.
(5b) If the notion of the role played by substances in a
mixture is extended so that, for example, ‘‘amount
of plasma’’ can play the role of solute for salt but
suspensor for blood cells, then there is no way to
ensure that the two ‘‘amounts of plasma’’ are the
same. However, note that the need to reify propor-
tions is more fundamental and does not arise mere-
ly because OWL is binary relational. Any complex
representation might have a number of varied ways
of characterising proportions that would be likely
to require treating proportions as entities in their
own right even in a formalism supporting relations
of more than two arguments (‘‘n-ary relations’’).
(5c) The relation between ingredients and portions can-
not be captured. For example, that the salt in the
water of the bay of the ocean is a portion of the salt
in the ocean as a whole. This problem is discussed
elsewhere [38]. It is a serious limitation but periph-
eral to the issues in this paper.The eﬀect of the above is that although most of the posi-
tive inferences from part–whole relations are supported in
the OWL representation because they follow from the tran-
sitive property of the part–whole relations and the property
hierarchy, important constraints cannot be, e.g., that noth-
ing can be a part of itself, directly or indirectly. Hence the
representation is reliable for inferring what is part of some-
thing but not for inferring what could not be part of
something.
5. Conclusion: A basis for describing tissues and biological
phenomena at multiple ‘‘granularities’’
The word ‘‘granularity’’ has been used in so many diﬀer-
ent ways by so many diﬀerent authors in so many diﬀerent
contexts that to try to enforce a single meaning on the term
seems unlikely to succeed. We have therefore used the
words ‘‘collectivity’’ and ‘‘size range’’ to distinguish two
notions that are often lumped together under the general
heading of ‘‘granularity.’’ We have labelled the relation
between grain and collective is_grain_of rather than
the more familiar is_member_of to avoid confusion with
mathematical sets deﬁned extensionally. Correspondingly
we propose a series of subrelations of which the two most
important are:
1. ‘‘Determinate parthood’’—the relation between ﬁngers
and hands;
2. ‘‘Granular parthood’’—the relation between cells of the
skin of the hand and the hand.
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Gross parthood between Determinate parthood and the most
general mereological parthood in order to accommodate
the notions of Portions and Ingredients.
We argue that the distinction between determinate and
granular parthood and the inclusion of collectives provides
a means of representing emergent phenomena—at what-
ever size. We also argue that the distinction provides useful
approaches to two further troublesome problems:
1. When to treat parthood as transitive.
2. When to treat parthood as persistent.
We argue that determinate parthood can be treated as
transitive and persistent, whereas granular parthood can-
not, although both imply the parent mereological parthood
relation which is, of course, transitive. An implementation
using the OWL property hierarchy is presented within a
cognitivist framework analogous to DOLCE [33,39]. The
elaboration of the techniques within a realist framework
remains to be demonstrated. Correspondingly signiﬁcant
work remains to be done to formalise the relations between
constituents, portions, and ingredients, but that lies outside
the main topic of this paper.
We argue that the two notions of collectivity and size are
eﬀectively independent and that boundaries between levels
of collectivity occur at all size ranges. In general, notions
such as ‘‘cellular scale,’’ ‘‘atomic scale,’’ and ‘‘cosmic scale’’
are nominally focused on size but often conﬂate the two
notions. For example, on the cellular scale one may want
to refer to the collectives of organelles such as mitochon-
dria or macromolecules. Furthermore, at least in biomedi-
cal applications, it is frequently necessary to refer both to
individual grains and to the collectives that they form—
e.g., both to ‘‘the sperm in the seminal ﬂuid’’ and to ‘‘the
individual sperm that fertilises the egg.’’
In an area where the language is fraught, we invite alter-
native suggestions for the labelling of any of the notions in
this paper. However, whatever the labelling, we suggest
that the central notion of collectives and grains is ubiqui-
tous and accounts for important phenomena both in bio-
medical and broader ontologies and accounts for the
criteria set out in Section 1.3.
Our primary motivation has been to provide a basis
for representation of the structure of biological materials
and substances—e.g., the pattern of arrangement of cells
in a tissue or the concentration of red cells in blood. To
represent information in standard formalisms, there must
be entities in the representation to which the information
applies. In the representation presented this role is
played by the classes Mixture, Proportion, and
Collective—respectively, for the material as a whole,
the relation of each ingredient to the mixture, and the
ingredients themselves, respectively. These notions have
been used in representations on a limited scale. The next
stage is to use them to try to provide a comprehensiveaccount of some small set of tissues for a practical applica-
tion. Likewise, the applicability of these representations to
broader areas outside biomedicine remains to be
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